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ABSTRACT 
Reconciliation has become a regular feature of the congressional 
budget process , We address the question of whether or under what 
conditions the budget process with reconciliation (modeled as 
selection of the size of the budget first and its division second ) 
produces smaller budgets than a piecemeal appropriations process i n  
which the size o f  the budget is determined residually . The 
theoretical result is that reconciliation sometimes results i n  
rel atively � budgets , A testable implication of the theory is 
that given a choice of how stringently reconciliation is to be 
employed , congressmen will jointly consider preferences and the 
expected outcomes under the available insti tutional arrangements and 
select the arrangement (usually a rule )  that yields the most favorable 
outcome . Empirical results from the budget process in the House from 
1 9 80-83 are generally supportive of the hypothesis of rational choice 
of institutional arrangements which is derived from the theory , 
RECONCILIATION AND THE SIZE OF THE BUDGET 
John Ferejohn and Keith Krehbiel 
Stanford University and 
California Institute of Technology 
In 1 974 Congress adopted a new process for making budgeting 
decisions . Instead of considering appropriations requests one at a 
time and letting the overall level of spending be determined 
residual l y ,  the 1 97 4  Budget and Impoundment Control Act ( PL 93-3 44) 
required Congress to enact a budget resolution that set overall 
spending levels and then instructed authorizations and appropriations 
committees to keep within those levels when considering separate 
appropriations bills . A key purpose of the Act was to encourage 
Congress to consider explicitly questions of fiscal policy and to make 
tradeoffs when setting spending levels for individual programs , 
Many of the proponents of the Act believed that the budget 
process would lead to a lower level of spending than would otherwise 
occur. Their argument was that each member of Congress has programs 
in which he or she is especially interested and will consequently 
attempt to expand through generous appropriations , But the sequential 
expansion of the many such programs ul timately leads to an overall 
level of spending that is higher than a majority would choose if the 
size of the budget were voted upon initially and directly, In other 
words , there was a widespread belief that everyone (or at least a 
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majority of both houses )  would prefer a lower budget level and 
correspondingly lower funding levels for individual programs than that 
which results from the piecemeal nature of pre- 1 97 4  budgetary 
politics . This reasoning enticed fiscal conservatives to crusade for 
budgetary reforms , and with the assistance of liberals who were 
increasingly disillusioned with President Nixon ' s  aggressive use of 
impoundments , reforms were passed almost unanimously . 1 
While the precise reasons for the overwhelming support for the 
Act can be disputed (Schick,  1 9 80 ) , there is no doubt that the debate 
surrounding its passage contains numerous references to its 
desireability as a tool to control budgetary growth (Fisher ,  1 9 85) . 
But recent events , such as the dramatic increase in deficits and a 
persistent i nability or unwillingness of either the Congress or the 
president to take correspondingly strong action , provide a basis for 
questioning the effectiveness of the 1 97 4  budget reforms . There is no 
strong evidence for the proposition that the Act has had the effect of 
controlling spending. Rather , there is merely the argument that 
without the 1974 Act ,  things would have been worse; levels of spending 
would have been higher and deficits larger . 
But determining whether the new budget process has achieved the 
goal of controlling expenditures , relative to an appropriate 
al ternative such as the old appropriations process , is a difficul t 
task , As Shepsle ( 1 984) notes , "the appropriate experiments cannot be 
run .112 Furthermore , while we cannot experiment with Congress,
Congress nevertheless can and does in effect experiment with itsel f 
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annually by choosing which of a variety of budgetary institutional 
arrangements to employ. Our approach to these twin complexities is to 
substitute theory for our inability to experiment , and then to use the 
annual congressional choices of institutional arrangements as sources 
of data suitable for testing our theory. We develop and analyze two 
models -- the new budget process with reconciliation and the old 
piecemeal appropriations process -- to provide a theoretical answer to 
the question of whether and when the new budget process results in 
smaller budgets than the old appropriations process . Then we test the 
theory by observing the House ' s  annual choice of institutional 
arrangements , interpreting roll call votes on procedural questions as 
revealed preferences for or against a budget process with strict 
reconciliation. 
RECONCILIATION IN THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 
Fiscal conservatives point with pride to the 1 9 81 budget and 
reconciliation process in which a number of spending programs were cut 
significantly. Participants suggest that this feat would have been 
impossible without the Budget Act (Miller and Range , 1 9 83 ) , and 
observers argue that it would have been exceedingly unlikely without 
the transformation of reconciliation from a narrowly applied second­
stage process , which it was initially intended to be , into a broadly 
applied first-stage process (Schick, 1 9 81 ) .  Although initially the 
successful use of the reconciliation mechanism depended on an 
extraordinary singleness of purpose by the members of a bipartisan 
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coalition, congressional budgeting since Reagan ' s  1 981 "bl itz" 
( LeLoup , 1 9 82)  suggests that reconciliation, in one form or another , 
will always be an insti tutional option during congressional budgeting. 
What , then , are i ts essential ingredients ,  and how can the process be 
modeled? 
Reconciliation is a multi-stage process , First , the House and 
Senate pass a budget resolution that includes instructions to 
committees to report changes in laws within their j urisdictions. 
Typically , the stated purpose of the reconciliation instructions is to 
reduce the size of the budget ,  although this need not be the case 
( Ellwood , 1 9 84 ) . Second , the committees to which the instructions are 
directed respond with changes that comply with the reconciliation 
targets , Although reconciliation instructions may include specific 
itemized suggestions for changes in program s ,  committees need not 
comply with specific requests , provided that the changes they do make 
comply with the reconciliation instructions. Committees then report 
their changes to the Budget Committee , which assembles them in the 
form of an omnibus reconciliation bill. Nex t ,  the reconciliation bill 
is reported to the floor where debate and amendments are typically 
constrained by a special rule in the House or a unanimous consent 
agreement in the Senate. Finally,  differences in House and Senate 
reconciliation bills must be resolved in a conference committee before 
the bill is enrolled and sent to the president . 
The progression of actual uses of reconciliation has been steady, 
if unanticipated , Reconciliation was not used at all until 1 97 7  when 
s 
a minor and somewhat idiosyncratic attempt in the Senate failed , and 
it was not attempted again'until 1 979 when the Senate successfully 
included instructions in the second resolution calling for $2 billion 
in savings . Although reconciliation was not formally part of the 
House ' s  version of the second resolution, Budget Committee Chairman 
Giaimo' s proposal which did pass was identical to the Senate version 
minus explicit reconciliation provisions . In the end , House 
committees behaved as if the resolution contained instructions , Nex t ,  
i n  1 9 80 ,  reconciliation was incorporated into the Senate ' s  and the 
House ' s  first resolutions , 3 and compliance with the instructions was
generally good: $ 8.2 bill ion in savings were achieved , from an 
initial reconciliation goal of $ 10. 6  bill ion . 
If there is a major mutation in the otherwise gradual evolution 
of the process,  it occurred in 1 9 81. As in 1 9 80 ,  reconciliation was 
incorporated in the first budget resolution , but several additional 
features of the 1 9 81 process were unprecedented , First , instructions 
pertained to legislation enacted in previous sessions; the prior scope 
of reconciliation was restricted to legislation to be enac ted between 
the first and second resolutions of the current session , Second , 
changes were ordered in substantive legislation for various existing 
programs; previously only appropriations levels for such programs were 
affected . And third , committees were instructed to take posi tive 
action on new issues that otherwise may not have been considered . 4 
Reactions to such changes ranged from passionate (but ineffective ) 
objections by poli ticians to well-reasoned ( but incorrect)  predictions 
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by political scientists , the common element of which was that 1 9 81 was 
an anomalous year . For example , Richard Boll ing , Chairman of the 
House Rules Committee, accused the president of "attempting to 
tyrannize a whole Congress ,  a whole people ,  • •  " and argued that 
reconciliation was "an attempt to destroy the budget process for 
narrow partisan gain in support of a radical , doubtful program " .5 And 
an early study of reconciliation concluded that "expanded 
reconciliation will not be a budget process for all seasons" ( Schick , 
1 9 81 , p .  4 3 ) . 
In contrast to the immediate reactions to reconciliation, 
hindsight now permits us to observe that 1 9 81 was neith er the sole 
season for reconciliation nor an especially peculiar one , Not only 
was it used before 1 9 81 , but more importantly reconciliation 
instructions h ave been included in the first resolution ever since 
1 9 81 . Furthermore, al though net savings from and commit tee compliance 
with reconciliation instructions h ave waxed and waned since 1 981 , an 
additional feature was added to the 1 9 82 through 1 9 85 budget 
resolutions that potentially makes the effect of reconcil iation more 
certain than it was in 1 9 81 -- language making the first resolution 
binding in the increasingly likely event that no second resolution is 
passed , In short , if reconciliation is not here to stay , at least it 
h as been employed in a sufficient number of budget cycles to warrant 
reconsideration, 
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A THEORY OF CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING 
We have only one history, of course, and in that history Congress 
passed the 1 974 Budget Act and came to rely on the availability if not 
the consistent application of reconciliation,  The practical effect of 
rigidly applied reconciliation is to set a budget ceiling during the 
first stage of the process , While perhaps not subscribed to 
universally,  such a view of reconciliation is increasingly orthodox , 6 
Ellwood ( 1 9 84 ) , for example ,  writes that 
by grouping a series of reductions into a single bill , [the 
reconciliation process] gives greater power to the aggregates 
( the "budget line " ) , The political debate can be shifted from 
the parts to the whole ,  particularly when the party leadership 
(at least in the House) obtains a limited or closed rule for the 
bill . ( p .  3 7 7 )  
Since w e  are interested in the relative budget sizes likely to 
result from two different institutional arrangements but are unable to 
experiment with Congress,  we need a convincing theory of budgeting 
that enables us to predict budget sizes , Al though our versions of the 
old piecemeal appropriations process and the new budget process with 
reconciliation are quite stylized , they are nevertheless consistent 
with many descriptive accounts of old versus new forms of 
congressional budgeting , 7 Each is a special case of a general theory 
that is consistent with two intuitions about congressional budgeting , 
First,  in each of our models decision-making occurs sequentially , As 
we construe i t ,  the piecemeal appropriations process that was in place 
before 1 974 involved the consideration of appropriations requests one 
at a time with the size of the budget determined ex post by summing 
the budget outlays granted in the separate appropriations bill s ,  In 
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contrast , in the budget process with reconciliation, a budget 
resolution is passed first ,  thereby setting the size of the budget ex 
ante,  after which appropriations bills are considered sequentially as 
in the appropriations process , except that the budget constraint is 
known.  
A second key feature of the general theory shared by the two 
specific models is that actors are sophisticated , Specifically ,  their 
votes at any given stage are influenced by others' preferences and by 
the consequences of the present choice on future choices , For 
example, in deciding on the first appropriations bill in a session , 
members will not ignore the fact that appropriating huge sums of money 
on current appropriations bills will leave less money for subsequent 
appropriations . Nor will they ignore what other members are likely to 
do , given their preferences and exercise of foresigh t .  
Ul timately , our theory enables u s  to predict not only 
individuals' behavior at given stages of the process but also 
aggregate outcomes , i . e . ,  the size of the budget and the mix of 
appropriations to various programs . The theoretical finding 
contradicts the charges of disillusioned Democrats in 1 9 81 as well as 
most conventional accounts of the effects of reconciliation . 8 In
short,  reconciliation does not necessarily lead to smaller budgets 
than would be produced by a process without reconciliation , Rather , 
the size of the budget depends on characterizable features of the 
preferences of legislators . 
9 
The General Theory. We assume that there are three dollar­
denominated activities with which the legislature is concerned: 
military spending , domestic spending, and the level of nongovernmental 
activi ty , We assume that the resources used in these activi ties sum 
to a constant , and we define the budget size ( or the size of the 
public sector) as domestic spending plus military spending , Each 
potential budgetary decision may therefore be represented as a point 
in a three-dimensional space , 
Each legislator is assumed to have Euclidean preferences 
( circular indifference curves ) over the space of policy al ternatives. 
Thus each member has a most preferred point , x0• For any two
alternatives ,  y and z ,  the member prefers y to z if and only if the 
Euclidean distance from x0 to y is less than the distance from x0 to
z. With this assumption about preferences , the members are completely
described by their ideal points , 
A number of charac teristics of this general theory are well 
known. For example ,  unless extremely restrictive assumptions are made 
about the distribution of the ideal points , there will be no pure 
majority rule equilibrium , However , if choice is restricted to a 
one-dimensional subset of the space, preferences on this subset will 
be single-peaked and there will be a unique majority rule equilibrium 
on that subset ,  We next consider and illustrate two special cases of 
the general theory,  both of which exploi t the foresight of actors 
which in essence constrains choice to a single dimension. 
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Model A: The Piecemeal Appropriations Process. Suppose that the 
legislature makes its allocative decision by breaking the problem into 
pieces and sequentially deciding on the components, as was 
characteristic of Congress prior to 1 974 reforms. For example ,  the 
legislature may decide on the level of military expenditures first and 
then turn to the question of allocating what is left over between 
domestic spending and , implici tly , private economic activity. For any 
particular order of business , the members' votes are determined by 
their anticipation of what will happen at the subsequent stage ( s ) , 
given what happens and happened at the current and prior stage ( s ) .  
Consider the three member legisl ature in figure 1 and suppose 
that member 3 proposes to set mili tary spending at m1 , which is 
represented by the horizontal line through his ideal point. Members 1 
and 2 examine the implications of an m1 decision at stage one for the 
subsequent decision on the domestic dimension. They are repelled by 
their expectation that at the second and final stage the median point 
on m1 will be selected , and they see that a stage one decision of 
lower mili tary expenditures would bring the outcome closer to their 
ideal point s .  Eventually, m2 ( the median of ideal points projected 
onto the military dimension) will be proposed and accepted at stage 
one , whereupon the median of the ideal points projected onto m2 will 
be selected at stage two. This point is always the intersection of 
medians, and under an insti tutional arrangement that permits changes 
on only one dimension at a time it is an equilibrium, 9 which we shall 
call the appropriations process equilibrium and henceforth l abel A. 
( figure 1 here) 
If each member has circular indifference curves , the 
appropriations process equilibrium does not depend on the order of 
consideration of the appropriations bills. This model is a special 
case of one considered by Kramer (1972)  in which he provided 
sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to be independent of the 
order of consideration of the bills. Moreover , as Kramer observed , 
the equilibrium corresponds exactly to a sophisticated voting 
outcome.10
Model �: The Budget Process with Reconciliation . Suppose that
instead of considering appropriations bills immediately, members 
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initially take up the question of the size of the budge t ,  after which 
they decide on the allocation of resources for domestic and military 
purposes. Given a particular size of the budget (represented by a 4 5  
degree line ) , the allocation question becomes one-dimensional and 
therefore has a unique majority rule equilibrium. This allows members 
to choose the size of the budget ,  conditioned by their expectations of 
what mix of military and domestic appropriations will result from 
different budget sizes , This process is illustrated in figure 2. 
( figure 2 here) 
The key to showing the existence and finding the location of the 
budget process equilibrium is that any given budget size has an 
associated outcome. For example , if b1 were the budget size selected
at stage one , then subsequent decision-making would yield the mix of 
domestic and military spending represented by o1 , which is the median
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of ideal points projected onto the b1 budget line. Similarly,  budget
sizes b2 and b3 have associated outcomes of o2 and o3 , respectively. 
Since our congressmen are sophisticated , they will not sel ect a budget 
size without anticipating the consequences of th at first choice on 
subsequent choice about how the budget is to be divided , Thus , b1 is
not a likely budget size since members 1 and 2 obviously prefer 
outcomes associated with smaller budget sizes , Nor is b2 likely since
members 2 and 3 prefer outcomes associated with larger budget sizes. 
Clearly, if there is an equilibrium under the specified conditions , 
such a point must be in the set of budget size associated outcomes and 
must not be preferred by a majority to any other point in such a set. 
In figure 2, the set of budget associated outcomes is represented by 
the line perpendicular to the budget lines and passing through the 
ideal point of the median voter ( member 3 )  with respect to the budget 
l ines , A projection of ideal points onto the line of budget 
associated outcomes reveals legislator 2 as the median voter in this 
one-dimensional subspace. The point o3 therefore uniquely meets the 
specified condi tions and is a budget process equilibrium, which we 
l abel B .  
Having demonstrated that both the appropriations process and the 
budget process with reconciliation possess equilibria ,  we can address 
the question of whether the size of the budget will always be smaller 
under the budget process with reconciliation than under the piecemeal 
appropriations process. Figure 3 shows that no general relationship 
exists. In figure 3 a ,  conventional wisdom is confirmed; total 
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expenditures under the budget process ( B )  are exceeded b y  total 
expenditures under the appropriations process ( A ) .  However , when the 
configuration of ideal points is al tered , as in figure 3 b ,  the budget 
process produces the opposite outcome -- larger expenditures than 
under the piecemeal appropriations process , 
( figure 3 here) 
Thus far we have established that not only do institutional 
arrangements make a difference in budgeting outcomes , but more 
specifically the difference they make depends on the configuration of 
preferences of actors. Our ultimate theoretical task is to 
characterize configurations of preferences that will and will not make 
reconciliation a budget reducing institutional arrangement. ( We 
continue to focus on two dimensions of expenditure , even though the 
result is general izable. ) 
For convenience of exposi tion , we assume that the legislature is 
large enough so that the distribution of members' ideal points can be 
described by a nonatomic probability measure , µ, that is absolutely 
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on lR2. Then the
proportion of ideal points in a set of points , X, is written µ (X ) , 
First normal ize expenditures so that the piecemeal appropriations 
equilibrium ( point A) is the origin. Now define the following sets of 
points that partition the space as illustrated in figure 4. 
( figure 4 here ) 
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Since the appropriations process equilibrium is the intersection of 
medians, and the budget process is the intersection of medians of 
ideal points that have been projected onto the axes rotated 4 5  
degrees, the following proposition can be easily demonstrated. 
I&!!!!!!.a: The budget process equilibrium, B, has a budget size 
larger than that of the piecemeal appropriations equilibrium, A,  
if and only if µ(P) + µ(U) + µ(T) 1/2. 
We now state and prove the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
budget process with reconciliation to increase the size of the budget. 
Theorem: The budget size of the budget process equilibrium, B,  
exceeds the budget size of the piecemeal appropriations 
equilibrium, A, if and only if µ(P) > µ(S) and µ(T) > µ(Q), 
Proof, We begin with an inequality (implied by the lemma) which 
defines budget-increasing reconciliation, namely, 
µ(P) + µ(U) + µ(T) µ(Q) + µ(R) + µ(S), (1) 
Using the definitions of the regions in figure 4 ,  we show how (1) 
implies the stated results, ( 9) and (10) below. Point A ,  by 
definition, is the intersection of the median ideal points 
projected onto the major axes, Therefore the major axes 
partition the space as such: 
µ(P) + µ(Q) + µ(R) 
= µ(U) + µ(T) + µ(S) 1/2, 
and 
µ(Q) + µ(P) + µ(U) µ(R) + µ(S) + µ(T) = 1/2, 
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(2) 
( 3 )  
Cancelling out µ(P) and µ(Q) from the left-hand (and equal) terms 
of (2) and ( 3 )  gives 
µ(R) µ(U), ( 4)  
which, combined with ( 3 ) , implies 
µ(P) + µ(Q) µ(S) + µ(T). ( S )  
Now, using ( 4 ) , cancel the terms µ(R) and µ(U) from (1), leaving 
µ(P) + µ(T) µ(Q) + µ(S) • ( 6) 
Rearranging ( S )  gives 
µ(Q) µ(S) + µ(T) - µ(P), ( 7 )  
which can be substituted into ( 6) , yielding 
µ(P) + µ(T) µ ( S) + µ(T) - µ(P) + µ(S), ( 8) 
Cancellation, rearranging and division by 2 in ( 8) yields 
µ(P) µ(S) • ( 9 ) 
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Finally, ( 9) and ( S )  imply 
µ(T) µ(Q). (10) 
This proves sufficiency of (1) for ( 9) and (10), Necessity can 
be proven by working backward in similar fashion, 
Q,E.D. 
Figure 4 helps illuminate the political substance that underlies 
the result. Theoretically, we know that a heavy concentration of 
ideal points in regions P and T, relative to regions S and Q, 
respectively, means that reconciliation will have the somewhat 
counterintuitive effect of increasing the budget, The political 
translation is necessarily somewhat cumbersome but nonetheless 
meaningful, Notice first that members in P and T are differentiated 
from members in S and Q in terms of whether their desires for 
increases in expenditures in one area exceed their desires for 
decreases in the other (relative to the origin after normalization), 
Accordingly, the theorem has the interpretation that implementation of 
a budget process with strict reconciliation will result in a 
relatively large budget if and only if the number of strong­
hawk/moderate-domestic-conservatives (P) exceeds the number of 
moderate-domestic-liberal/strong-doves ( S) , and the number of strong­
domestic-liberal/moderate-doves (T) exceeds the number of moderate­
hawk/strong-domestic-conservatives (Q) , In such circumstances an 
implicit, mutually beneficial agreement will be made to increase the 
overall level of spending. Indeed, many explanations of the 
persistence of high deficits are consistent with this translation of 
the formal argument. 
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Yet our theory is noncooperative. There is no assumption that a 
backroom bargain takes place that results in relatively high levels of 
spending under the budget process. The rules of the chambers do not 
permit members to make binding commitments across votes, Therefore, 
one cannot generally expect mutually beneficial transactions to be 
made. Indeed, the fact that there is no pure majority rule 
equilibrium implies that in the absence of the institutional structure 
we impose and which induces our equilibrium, there would always be an 
opportunity for some majority to improve its welfare. Whatever 
bargains occur must therefore be entirely implicit and must take place 
in such a fashion that it is in the interest of each party to execute 
his part of the agreement at the appropriate moment. 
A TEST OF THE THEORY 
An ideal test of the theory would consist of estimating each 
individual's ideal point in a 16-dimensional space (one dimension for 
each of the functional categories in the budget resolution),11
calculating the budget process equilibrium as a 16-tuple dollar 
values, observing the outcome of the budget process in the form of 
congressional appropriations, and finally assessing how close the 
predicted outcome is to the observed outcome, Obviously, this is not 
possible. A few of the many prohibitive obstacles deserve mention, 
First, the ideal test requires estimation techniques that have not 
been developed, namely, the identification of ideal points for each 
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member, stated in dollar values, Second, the functional categories of 
the budget resolution do not correspond precisely with the subsequent 
appropriations measures, Moreover, Congress typically fails to pass 
at least a few such appropriations bills, And third, since we cannot 
make Congress repeat the budget processes in a given year under 
different institutional arrangements, we can test at most one of the 
models per year, and even then there are no straightforward criteria 
for determining what a good or close prediction is. 
In spite of these difficulties we are unwilling to discard the 
theory as untestable. Rather, we devise and perform an indirect test 
which at minimum provides an opportunity to reject the theory, The 
test exploits the fact that in each year since 1980 the House made an 
observable choice about the form of its budget process to implement, 
While the House's menu of institutional arrangements does not include 
our relatively pure forms (at least not the pure piecemeal 
appropriations model), it nevertheless includes arrangements that 
approximate one model or the other. The most straightforward example 
is 1981, in which the key procedural vote was explicitly about 
consideration of the Gramm-Latta reconciliation bill under either an 
open or a closed rule, Though sometimes less explicit, comparable 
choices in other years were always between rules that had the effect 
of opening the budget resolution to amendments thereby approximating 
sequential appropriations, or barring it from amendments in which case 
the reconciliation provision had a greater chance of being binding, 
(The Appendix contains a detailed description of the votes,) 
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Our test, therefore, is an analysis of procedural votes. It 
consists of three steps: estimation of ideal points in a two­
dimensional space, computation of the equilibrium outcomes under the 
two pure models, and assessment of the degree to which votes on the 
procedural motion (interpreted as a choice between different 
institutional arrangements) are consistent with various hypotheses. 
The votes predicted by our theory require that members behave as if 
they know and believe the theory. More concretely, individual 
congressmen know the consequences of the real-world analogues to 
reconciliation and piecemeal appropriations, and given their 
expectations about the budget outcomes that would result under each 
(approximated) procedure, they choose rationally among the procedures, 
If a member's ideal point is closer to A than to B, the member will 
oppose the procedure that has the effect of making the budget 
resolution binding, preferring instead to have the opportunity to make 
piecemeal changes (via amendments) in expenditure ceilings, If votes 
are consistent with this hypothesis of rational choice of 
institutional arrangements, therefore, the model will be supported, 
In contrast, if competing hypotheses predict as well or better, then 
we will reject our theory. 
As depicted in the theory, the three substantive ingredients 
represented by ideal points are preferences on domestio policy, 
defense policy, and overall government spending. Although there is an 
expanding literature on (and controversies surrounding) measurement of 
preferences,1 2  we proceed with a relatively simple scaling technique 
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based on three corresponding interest group ratings. First, we define 
a vector x = Cx1, x2) in which the first component is the member's 
League of Women's Voters score (based primarily on domestic roll call 
votes), and the second component is the member's National Security 
Index (reflecting the degree of pro-defense voting as evaluated by the 
American Security Council). This vector is then scaled as a function 
of overall anti-spending roll call voting behavior, as measured by the 
National Taxpayer's Union score. The formula for the ideal point is: 
x0 = [1 - (NTU I 200)] x. 
All scores range from 0-100, thus, for example, the most fiscally 
conservative members (NTU = 100) are scaled back halfWay towards the 
origin, while NTU's "biggest spenders" who score O maintain their 
original values of x1 and x2• 
Given the estimated ideal points, identification of equilibria 
for the appropriations and budget processes is straightforward. The 
appropriations process equilibrium (A) is the intersection of medians 
on the domestic and military dimensions; the budget process 
equilibrium ( B) is the intersection of medians of projected ideal 
points onto the axes rotated 45 degrees. 
We are interested in the relative predictive power of five 
hypotheses, three of which formally embody individual-level rational 
choice, and two of which are representative of conventional and 
relatively informal accounts of congressional budgeting since 1974. 
The hypotheses are: 
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1 .  Rational choice of institutional arrangements . Members 
consider both the size of the budget and how it is divided , 
Predictions are determined by the relative distances between a 
member ' s  ideal point and the institution-associated equilibria ,  A 
and B ,  as determined by H1 ( see figure 5 ) , 
( figure 5 here) 
2 .  Rational choice of budget size ( fiscal liberalism-
conservatism) . A member chooses the insti tutional arrangement 
according to his preference on size of the budget ( without regard 
to i ts division) . The separating hyperplane , H2 , is a 45 degree 
northwest-to-southeast line passing through point C (which is 
equidistant from A and B ) . 
3. Rational choice of budget division (guns-versus-butter
liberalism-conservatism) ,  A member chooses the institutional 
arrangement according to his preference on division of the 
budget,  namely high domestic and low military spending versus 
high military and low domestic spending , Budget size,  however, 
is not taken i nto account . Hyperplane 3 ,  a 4 50 southwest-to-
northeast line passing through C partitions the set of ideal 
points and determines this prediction. 
4. Conventional wisdom, lli!!'.1.Y· Republicans ( assumed to be more
fiscally conservative than Democrats ) vote for the budget process 
with reconciliation, which they believe will result in a smaller 
budget; Democrats do the opposi te . 
FIGURE 5 
Separating Hyperplanes for Hypotheses 1 - 3 
x2: Military Spending 
A 
x1: Domestic Spending 
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5. Conventional wisdom , � and region. Republicans and
Southern Democrats ( assumed to be more fiscally conservative than 
non-Southern Democrats ) vote for the budget process with 
reconciliation. Non-Southern Democrats vote for piecemeal 
appropriations.  
Hypo theses 2 and 3 are included as null models ,  albeit models 
with some theoretical and spatial foundation. One main empirical 
question is whether hypothesis 1, which j ointly considers questions of 
budget size and budget division, predicts better than the models in 
which only size or division is considered, Hypotheses 2 and 3 ,  then, 
can be viewed as constrained versions of our theory. In contrast, 
hypotheses 4 and 5 ,  have no explicit spatial or theoretical basis, but 
have been proffered by observers of recent cycles of congressional 
budgeting, The relevant comparison here is not hypothesis 4 with 5, 
but rather hypotheses 4 and 5 with 1. The l atter comparison answers 
the question of whether an explicit theoretical account of how 
preferences are expressed in a rich institutional context facilitates 
prediction of congressional behavior and budgetary outcomes, 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the percentage of votes correctly predicted by 
each hypothesis in 1 9 80-1 9 83. Overall , hypothesis 1 -- rational 
choice of insti tutional arrangements predicts best, Next best in 
overall performance are hypotheses 3 and 2, the restricted versions of 
our theory, Finally , the hypotheses based on regularities in party
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voting and in party-region coalition formation have the worst overall 
records , dropping below 50 percent for the four-year period, The 
bottom line , then, supports the generalization that the more 
information a theory explicitly incorporates about individual 
preferences, the better it will predict endogenous insti tutional 
choices, 
( table 1 here) 
But inasmuch as the bottom line fails to convey the whole story , 
it is useful to look more closely at individual years, as summarized 
in figure 6. First consider the year in which the conventional wisdom 
hypotheses perform best and on which ( understandably)  much of 
conventional wisdom is based : 1 9 81. Unified Republicans coalesced 
with fiscally conservative Southern Democrats ( Boll Weevils )  to adopt 
the most dramatic reconciliation package in the four-year period, 
Accordingly , hypotheses 4 and 5 correctly predict a high percentage of 
the votes -- 93 , 0  and 85 , 3, respectively, But inspection of the 
distribution of preferences in 1 9 81 illustrates three less obvious 
points, First , consistent with conventional wisdom, ideal points were 
such that reconciliation resul ted in a relatively small budget in 
1 9 81. Second, the data and theory suggest that the bulk of the 
reductions in expendi tures should have occurred on the domestic 
dimension, which indeed they did, And third , although overshadowed by 
the performance of the party-based conventional wisdom hypothesis, our 
hypothesis nevertheless scores an impressive 86.7 percent. Thus the 
conventional wisdom about 1 9 81 appears to have a theoretical basis, 
Figure 6 
Distribution of Ideal Points 
and Normalized Locations of Equilibria, 1980-83* 
1980 
59 
2 . 
115 
A 
• B 
42 
B (0.8, -0. 7) 
1982 
-45 
--+---1>2 --
-44 
-�l 
111 
B (-8. 6, • 02) 
102 
B 
B 
48 
1981 
-
_ __ _J__ 
(-8.5, -0.8) 
1983 
(-8.6, -4.9) 
* The piecemeal appropriations equilibrium (A) is always
at the origin (O,O). Numbers denote members whose
i deal points were located in the given region. 
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( slightly) the size of the budget .  Consequently, i n  contrast t o  1 9 81 
and 1 9 82, hypotheses 4 and S predict very poorly ( 3 , 8  percent and 20 . 1  
percent ) . Democrats overwhelmingly favored a budget process with 
reconciliation in 1 9 80 while Republicans opposed i t .  Moreover, since 
the Democrats supporting reconciliation tended to have ideal points in 
the pro-domestic anti-military regions of the space, our hypothesis 
and the budget division hypothesis predicted quite well ( 76 .S and 76.7 
percent, respectively) . Still, given the closeness of the two 
equilibria in 1 9 80 and the crudeness of our estimated ideal points, we 
cannot be too confident of this support.  
At this stage in the analysis we expected 1 983 to be a uniquely 
useful if not decisive year for the test . Interpretations of the 1 9 82 
election and of the subsequent 1 9 83 budget process made us expect that 
the configuration of preferences in 1 9 83 would more closely 
approximate that of 1 9 80 than 1 9 81 and 19 82 . Democrats gained 26 
seats in the 1 9 82 election by running against Reagan's domestic 
spending outs . Republicans meanwhile stressed differences between 
their preferences and Reagan ' s  policies and recession. Moreover, 
these apparent trends toward restoration of spending persisted into 
the budget cycl e .  The House Budget resolution, which called for a $ 3 3  
billion increase in domestic spending was dubbed the "Democratic 
Manifesto, " and House Republicans went to extremes not to consider 
Reagan's budget, which called for further reductions in domestic 
spending . The Republican strategy was to seek a rule that would have 
permitted consideration of as many as 15 amendments, a la sequential 
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appropriations . But the Democrats won the procedural battle in 1 9 83 ,  
passing a modified-closed rul e .  In practice the rule was completely 
closed since Republicans , not wanting to embarrass Reagan, declined to 
put forth a substi tute.  
The Administration was similarly unenthusiastic about its 
prospects for a repeat performance of reconciliation, The 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac called it an "ironic turnabout" that 
the Reagan administration displayed growing disenchantment with 
the [reconciliation] process which the president had used as a 
vehicle for implementing his economic program in 1 9 81 and 1 9 82 . 
As lawmakers whittled away at Reagan ' s  proposed military spending 
increase , Defense Secretary Caspar W .  Weinberger suggested to the 
president that the administration might be better off without a 
congressional budget ,  That way, Weinberger reasoned , Reagan 
might be able to get more money for defense in the appropriations 
process,  and he would be able to veto funding bills for ot�ir 
programs if he thought they were too high , ( 1 9 83 ,  p ,  43 5 )  
How might these perceptions and events be summarized in terms of 
the theory? Electoral outcomes suggest movement from S to T ( and 
perhaps from Q to P) in the policy space , while Weinberger 's  strategy 
suggests that the old appropriations process would have resul ted in 
greater defense spending than would strict reconciliation. Thus the 
budget process equilibrium could be expected to be located east-
southeast of the appropriations equilibrium -- south if Weinberger 's  
expectation of lower defense spending under the budget process were 
correct ,  and be east if the strength of the Democrats were in fact 
based on a desire for restoration of domestic programs , The 
corresponding prediction of our theory would be for such Democrats to 
succeed in using reconciliation to bring about a relative increase in 
the budget . However , as figure 6 show s ,  not all such changes were 
reflected in the data . Reconciliation indeed seems to have kept 
military expenditures relatively low ( as Weinberger feared ) , and 
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Democrats definitely supported reconciliation instructions and won on 
the key vote ( see table 1 ,  hypothesis 4 ) . But because the expected 
easterly shift of B relative to A did not occur , all five hypotheses 
predict poorly in 1 9 83, 
The results from 1 9 83 raise the awkward question of whether the 
theory or the data are wrong . While ul timately the reader should make 
such a j udgment , presently we cannot deny that our prediction is poor 
in 1 9 83; we can merely point to assorted electoral facts , legislative 
strategies , and administrative statements that seem more consistent 
with our theory than with our data . In contrast , it is not possible 
to explain away the failure of the conventional wisdom hypotheses in 
1 9 83 ( or i n  1 9 80) , Indisputably , Republicans sometimes oppose the new 
budget process with reconciliation. We are therefore left with one 
confident and two tentative findings , The confident finding is the 
considerable direct evidence against hypotheses based on conventional 
notions of party and region. The tentative findings include some 
direct evidence for the hypothesis of rational choice of institutional 
arrangements , and thus some indirect evidence for our insti tution- and 
preference-based theory of congressional budgeting , 
DISCUSSION 
The theory of the budget process was developed and tested in the 
context of a simple two-dimensional policy space ( with an implicit 
third dimension representing nongovernmental activity) and under some 
TABLE 1 
Percentage of Votes Correctly Predicted 
by the Five Hypotheses 
Coordinates of Equilibria: Hypotheses:* 
Year N Appropriations Budget 1. 
1980 421 (39,0, 42.8) (39,7, 42 .2) 76.5 
1981 427 (42. 4' 54.0) (33. 9' 53.2) 86.7 
1982 417 (43. 5, 54 .5) (34.9, 54. 5) 69.3 
1983 426 (52,8, 39.2) (44.2, 34,3) 17.8 
Average 62.6 
Rank 1 
* 1. Rational choice of institutional arrangements 
2, Rational choice of budget size 
3, Rational choice of budget division 
4. Conventional wisdom party 
5. Conventional wisdom party-region 
2. 3. 4. 
62.7 76.7 3,8 
65.1 78.2 93.0 
64.3 63,6 77.0 
34.0 13,1 7.0 
56.9 57.9 45.2 
3 2 5 
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5, 
20.1 
85.3 
70.5 
18.7 
48.7 
4 
( figure 6 here ) 
The situation is similar in 1 9 82. The distribution of ideal 
points is comparable in 1 9 81 and 1 982 as one would expec t in the 
absence of an intervening election. Accordingly , the reconciliation 
equilibrium ( B) again produces a smaller budget than that for 
piecemeal appropriations ( A ) . Notice , however , that the relative 
reduction comes at the expense of domestic spending; point B is 
actually slightly greater on the military dimension , While we are 
reluctant to make too much of this difference , it nevertheless seems 
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consistent with the final outcome of the 1 9 82 budget process in which 
defense spending continued to increase significantly in spite of 
further cuts in domestic spending.1 3  Finall y ,  as in 1 9 81 each
hypothesis predicts reasonably wel l ,  although not as well as in the 
previous year. 
The combined analyses for 1 9 81 and 1 9 82 underscore the 
difficulties with selecting one hypothesis over another when they 
yield simil ar predictions. Such will be the case whenever Republicans 
are predominantly fiscally conservative, Democrats tend to be bigger 
spenders, and the condition of the theorem is not met. Thus for a 
convincing demonstration that our theory is an improvement upon 
conventional wisdom , it would be useful to observe a year in which the 
configuration of preferences meets the condition stated in the 
theorem . 1 9 80 is such a year , although j ust barely. Here strict 
reconciliation has the theoretical effect opposite that in 1 9 82: to 
increase domestic spending, decrease defense spending, and increase 
fairly strong assumptions . Our choice of simplicity over complexity 
was dictated by our strong desire to test the theory , even if only 
indirectly . In conclusion we note some possible theoretical 
modifications and then place our results in the context of prior 
studies of the budget process . 
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The two assumptions that are perhaps most objectionable are 
circular preferences and the number of issues . The number of issues 
under consideration is not essential to the formal argument . We 
restricted our attention to two issues -- domestic and military 
spending -- only to facilitate exposition and to maintain a 
resemblance between the theory and actual congressional budgetary 
politics . In principle ( if not in practice ) , the theoretical results 
can be extended and applied to a world with , say , thirteen 
appropriations bills , in which case the appropriations and budget 
process equilibria could be derived . Similarly , the distributional 
conditions for reconciliation resulting in a larger budget could be 
determined , But the calculations would be more complicated and the 
conditions for different budget sizes under different institutional 
arrangements would be difficul t to interpret . Furthermore, the 
argument that members possess good enough information about one 
another ' s  preferences to behave in fully sophisticated ways would be 
difficult to sustain .  
A second possible theoretical modification would b e  t o  relax the 
assumption on preferences from circularity to strict convexity . Then 
it would still be true that every one-dimensional subset of the space 
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has a unique majori ty rule equilibrium , however the location of the 
new equilibrium would depend on the order in which appropriations 
bills arise . This raises two problems.  First , because there will be 
several different order-dependent equilibria under each institution i t  
would not b e  clear how t o  assess the effect o f  changing from one 
institution to another . Second , if members did not know the order in 
which the appropriations bill s  were to be decided , their calculations 
of voting strategies would not be straightforward . In essenc e ,  
equilibria would still exist , but in the absence o f  imposing some 
additional structure on the problem ( such as a specified order of 
voting on appropriations) it is unlikely that real actors would behave 
such that the equilibria were obtained . 
There are two ways of addressing this situation, although neither 
is completely satisfactory . We could assume that members knew the 
order in which bills were considered and that the order is the same 
with or without the new budget process . But historically the ordering 
of congressional appropriations bills is erratic . Al ternatively , we 
could assume that members believed that each order was equally likely 
and that at each stage they calculated the consequences of their 
decisions accordingly , The consequences of this modification are 
unclear . 
In light of these difficul ties , and for the reasons specified in 
footnote 1 0, we employed the stronger assumption about preferences 
rather than positing a known order of voting . Under such conditions 
the order of consideration of bills is not essential to our principal 
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theoretical result, namely, that the equilibrium under the budget 
process with reconciliation is positive with respect to the piecemeal 
appropriations equilibrium if and only if a majority prefers to move 
in a budget increasing direction (or, technically, that a majority of 
members have gradients in P, U, or T, illustrated in figure 4 ) , 
While not overwhelming, the empirical support for the theory is 
reasonably strong, given that the theory is motivated by individuals' 
preferences and that good measures of such preferences are difficul t 
to devise . Naturally, we invite advocates of various emerging 
techniques ( see footnote 12, supra) to reassess our results using the 
method of their choice . Our choice, as noted earlier, was shaped by 
our desire for simplicity , 
With these qualifications, and insofar as the failure of the 
conventional wisdom hypotheses is convincing, our contrasting 
inability to reject the hypothesis derived from our theory must be 
interpreted as supportive , We hasten to add, however, that by 
rejecting party- and region-based accounts of voting, we are not 
maintaining that party and region are unimportant in congressional 
budgeting , To the contrary, major roll call votes on the floor during 
the budget process are almost invariably partisan, and significant 
deviations from partisan votes are often associated with geographic 
region, especially in the 1 9 80s and in the House , Nevertheless, the 
temptation to respond to such empirical regularities by embracing 
party and region as explanations for congressional behavior should be 
avoided, because in the absence of additional information the 
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associated predictions are vacuous . In the case of choosing budgetary 
insti tutional arrangements, for example, a prediction that a member 
will vote with his party ( o r  region) says nothing explicit about why 
he will do so, nor does i t  say which way other members of his party 
(or region) will vote.  The key points are that the party and region 
variables are proxies for preferences, and that such preferences 
when combined with member ' s  expectations about how institutions 
work -- are the real predictors of congressional behavior in the 
budget process . 
Granted, these ideas are not new . Students of electoral behavior 
are undoubtedly familiar with the argument that the party variable is 
a proxy for preferences ( Page and Jones, 1 97 9; Florina, 1 9 81; Rivers, 
1 9 8 1 ) ,  and more recently the same observation has transported to the 
study of congressional budgeting (West, 1 9 85 ) . Similarly, the 
combined effects of preferences and institutions are increasingly 
prevalent in two bodies of the congressional literature , Most obvious 
of these are theoretical studies that have expanded· upon Shepsle ' s  
( 1 979)  notion of structure-induced equilibria, such a s  Denzau and 
Mackay ( 1983 ) , Krehbiel ( 1 9 85 ) ,  Shepsle ( 19 85 ) ,  and Shepsle and 
Weingast ( 1 9 85 ) , But several recent empirical studies, too, are 
implicitly consistent with the combined effects of preferences and 
insti tutions explicitly incorporated into our theory . For example, 
Brady ( 19 85 )  and Brady and Morgan ( 1 9 83 )  have studied extensively how 
congressional electoral outcomes are translated into congressional 
policy outcomes, the key links being changes in members ' preferences 
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and occasional calculated changes in internal institutional features . 
Similarly, Kiewiet and McCubbins ( 19 85 )  demonstrate how electoral 
incentives of congressmen affect budget outcomes . Stewart ( 1 9 85 )  
examines the effects of institutional decentralization in the 
appropriations process in the late 1 9th century, and finds that while 
changes in insti tutions alone may not affect outcomes , changes in 
institutions and preferences can. And Kiewiet and Mccubbins ( 1 984) 
argue that preferences ,  institutional features and budgetary 
reversionary points define classes of strategic situations for the 
president and Congress, whereby superior predictions of appropriations 
outcomes are possible. 
While consistent with several prior studies , this research 
uniquely introduces a testable individual-level theory of the 
congressional budget process . To the question of whether a budget 
process with reconciliation reduces the size of the budget relative to 
a sequential appropriations process, our theoretical answer -- "not 
necessarily" -- is ostensibly equivocal. But fortunately the theory 
has testable implications . If the data are to be believed , then the 
answer to the parallel empirical question -- whether the budget 
process in practice has reduced the size of the budget relative to 
alternative arrangements -- is almost surely "yes" for the early 
' 80s , 15 Perhaps critical observers of the new congressional budget
process will doubt such a finding , but rather than pursue it further 
we prefer to conclude more generally. We are persuaded by, and think 
we have corroborated , Ellwood's (1984) argument that the effect of 
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reconciliation on budget sizes is "neutral on i ts face ." But 
additionally we hope to have demonstrated why the institutional story 
is not the whole story , neither in theory nor in practice. In 
prac tice , the theoretical neutrality of the institution of 
reconciliation is annually tempered by individual members ' 
preferences. Thus Shepsle ' s  ( 1 979)  thesis that preferences and 
institutions "conspire" to produce structure-induced equilibria takes 
on a more concrete meaning in the context of the congressional budget 
process.  Preferences of individual congressmen towards spending and 
their ability to choose institutional arrangements are indeed co­
conspirators in budgetary outcomes . 
3 4  
APPENDIX 
VOTES 
In 1 9 80 the key vote (#456) was on the rule that would govern 
debate on the reconciliation bil l ,  HR 7765 .  The modified closed rul e ,  
HRes 7 7 6 ,  would have permitted only "technical amendments" (CQ 
Almanac , 1 9 80 ,  p. 1 28) , The decisive vote came o n  Rules Committee 
Chairman Richard Bolling 's  motion for the previous question which in 
effect blocked amendments on the rule ( and in turn blocked all 
controversial amendments from the bill ) . A yea vote therefore is 
interpreted as supportive of the budget process in which 
reconciliation was successfully employed for the first time , 
Conversely , a nay vote would have resulted in attempts to amend the 
rule , namely by allowing for greater amendments on the bill to which 
it pertained , The vote was 250 for and 157 against . ( For the data 
analysis we coded pairs and announcements as if they were votes , )  
In preparation for debate on the 1 9 81 reconciliation bill , 
Democrats wrote a rule for floor debate under which members would vote 
separately on spending cuts included in the bill ( and supported by the 
Administration) . Had it passed , the binding effect of reconciliation 
clearly would have been undermined ,  whereas under the procedure 
favored by the Republicans and conservative Democrats a single up-or­
down vote was taken on the Gramm-Latta package . Vote #95 was the main 
procedural vote ( CQ Almanac , 1 9 81 ,  p, 262) , The motion was rejected 
21 0-217 . 
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There was no comparable controversy over rules in 1 9 82 ,  al though 
there was a dispute during consideration of the first budget 
resolution that determined how rigidly the expenditure l evels would be 
enforced , To each of three substitutes to the resolution ,  
Appropriations Committee Chairman Jamie Whitten proposed amendments 
that called for the removal of deferred enrollment . Deferred 
enrollment is a provision that requires any appropriation that exceeds 
the budget ceil ing (established by the resolution) to be kept from 
going to the president , ( See Fisher , 1 9 85 ,  pp . 9-10 for a discussion 
of deferred enrollment . )  Whitten ' s  proposed removal of the provision 
therefore would have made it possible for appropriations to exceed the 
ceiling established by the resolution, which of course is contrary to 
a budget process in which the resolution is genuinely binding , Roll 
call votes were taken on only two of his three amendment s ,  and the 
analysis reported is of the first vote (#11 9 ) . A vote against the 
amendment is interpreted as support for the budget process ( CQ 
Almanac , 1 9 82 ,  pp,  1 94-95 ) , The amendment was adopted 21 2-205 . 
The key procedural vote in 1 9 83 was on the Democratic rule to the 
first budget resolution (#3 8 ) .  The rule permitted only one , 
Republican substitute to the Budget Committee ' s  resolution which 
otherwise was protected from amendments . A vote in favor of the 
modified closed rule is interpreted as support for the budget process, 
since the resolution contained provisions for making the spending 
ceilings of the first resolution binding if a second resolution were 
not passed , The vote was 230 for and 1 87 against . 
FOOTNOTES 
1 ,  The final votes in the House and Senate were 401-6 and 7 5-0, 
respectively , 
2 .  Others are similarly cognizant of this difficulty , See for 
example Schick ( 1 9 80 ) , LeLoup ( 1980) , Ellwood ( 1 9 83 ) , Copeland 
( 1 9 84) , Shepsle ( 1 9 84 ) , and Fisher ( 1 9 8 5 ) , 
3 ,  At the time , however , this was viewed as a pre-election 
"deviation" , See Reischauer ( 1 9 84 ,  p ,  3 9 9 ) , 
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4 .  For more detailed histories, see Schick ( 19 81 ) , Miller and Range 
( 1 983 ) , Reischauer ( 1 984) , Fisher ( 1 985 ) , and Gilmour ( 1 9 85 ) , 
5 ,  Quoted in The � York Times, June 1 7 ,  1 9 81 , p ,  A2 5 ,  and in 
LeLoup ( 19 82 , p.  3 2 3 ) . 
6 ,  Addi tional support can be found in Collender ( 19 83 )  and Gilmour 
( 19 8 5 ) . For a possibl e dissent -- or at minimum a persuasive 
argument that the new budget process has loopholes in spite of 
reconciliation -- see Fisher ( 1 984 ,  1 9 85) . 
7 ,  See for example Ellwood ' s  ( 1 9 83 )  ''fragmented" and "comprehensive" 
approaches , or Bozeman and Straussman ' s  ( 1 982)  "bottom-up" versus 
"top-down" processes . 
8 ,  An important exception is Ellwood ( 1 984) to whose work we shall 
return in the discussion , 
9 .  Notice that at the equilibrium ( A )  in figure 1 ,  any proposal in 
either a horizontal QI'. vertical direction ( but not both) will 
fail to receive a majority of votes , 
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1 0 .  The existence of such equilibria may be proved under much more 
general circumstances . If the members have strictly convex 
preference s ,  then, for any particular and commonly known ordering 
of bills for consideration, there will be an equilibrium. But 
since the location of the equilibrium depends on the order of 
consideration -- something that might not be known by all the 
members in advance -- the rational calculation of voting 
strategies by the members is impeded , For that reason we choose 
to focus on a model with restricted preferences rather than one 
in which members know the order of consideration of 
appropriations bil l s ,  W e  return t o  this assumption in the final 
section.  
1 1 . The number of functional categories has varied over the years , 
See Fisher ( 1 9 85 ) , p ,  2 0 ,  
1 2 ,  See for example ,  Carson and Oppenheimer ( 1 9 84 ) , Kal t and Zupan 
( 1 9 84) , Kau and Rubin ( 1 979) , and Poole ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 
1 3 , See Congressional Quarterly Almanac ( 1 982 ,  p ,  1 95 ) , 
1 4 .  See also Reischauer ( 1 984 , p ,  409) and Fisher ( 1 984,  p .  417) . 
3 8  
1 5 ,  Of the possible exceptions , 1 9 83 is questionable and 1 9 80 appears 
to have been a year in which the budget-increasing effect of 
reconciliation was minimal , 
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